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RUSSIA AND AMERICA COMPARED:
HOW HEAVY IS OUR WELFARE BURDEN?
David Makofsky Department of Sociology
Pembroke State University, Pembroke, North Carolina
ABSTRACT
A non-Western comparative model, totalitarianism, has
conventionally been employed to describe qualitative dif-
ferences between the United States on one hand, and the
nations of the Communist world on the other. This paper
explores welfare-related aspects of Communist (USSR) -
Western (US) differences: First, the quantity of welfare
and second, the mode of welfare distribution. In measur-
ing the volume of welfare as the proportion of the state
welfare expenses to the GNP or NMP respectively, the
Russian proportion from 1958 (USSR l8.S8,, U.S. 10.6%)
until the latest available comparative figures (USSR 23-
24%, US 15.2%) remains substantially greater. In terms of
welfare distribution, the Russian emphasis on distributing
welfare services to a broad catagory of citizens without
regard to need, that is, the subtle distribution of welfare,
has markedly different social consequences than the American
emphasis, usually demanding the eligibility of the client.
American-style distribution produces a never-ending process
of stigma and fraud, and contributes to the break-up of the
family. Finally, it produces the silent suffering of the
poor since, with all of the programs available in America,
there are more 'below-poverty line' families in the U.S.
that receive neither food stamps, public housing, or social
assistance as there are poor that do receive these services.
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1A non-Western comparative model, totalitarianism, has
conventionally been employed to describe the qualitative
differences between the United States on one hand and the
nations of the Communist world on the other. This paper
will explore other qualitative alternatives in Communist-
Western differences, and by concentrating on the Soviet
welfare system I hope to introduce material in a way that
is not conventionally included in this type of comparative
analysis.
Welfare practives have, of course, often been cited in
the literature on totalitarianism: Mark Field's (1957)
study of Soviet medicine, based on interviews with those
who had left the country after World War II, illustrates
the unfortunate medical consequences that come about when
a doctor's allegiance is to the state rather than to the
patient. Fainsod and Fisher, to choose two examples, have
written on the Soviet youth organization, the Komsomol, to
illustrate that the Soviet educational system is dominated
by the Communist Party in a manner that goes far beyond
biased textbooks and party-line teachers, and actually in-
volves the direct group-psychological manipulation of
children (Faisod, 1961; Fisher, 1959). Family services,
too, are another area where the state literally invaded
the private lives of individuals through welfare for the
purpose of directing mass efforts towards the satisfaction
of state needs (Geiger, 1968: 265-291).
Oppressive control has been part of the stark reality
of Soviet life, but the survey of totalitarian practices,
followed2by a rosy picture of life in our own pluralist
society, contains so many major faults that it is now
scarcely possible to accept 'totalitarian' theory at face
value as the major basis for capitalist-Communist compari-
son. The specific problems are two. (1) First, by concen-
trating on oppressive control rather than on welfare ser-
vices, the theory indicated the absurd conclusion that
individual freedom was the central issue, and that the
actual provision of welfare services was a secondary matter.
Nothing could be farther from the truth; the welfare ser-
vices were enthusiastically received and have played an
important part in post-revolutionary Russia, perhaps even
as important as political control, if the full 1917-74
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period is considered. (2) Second, those who followed the
'totalitarian' theory closely have also generally concluded
that current welfari failures in the West will be resolved
in the near future. Even a cursory view of services in the
United States demonstrates that a more critical perspective
must be followed if a truthful portrait is to emerge.
5
-- Table 1 about here --
Given the general popular support for state welfare
services in most industrial societies, given America's
affluence, and given the decades that have passed since
the onset of the depression, the weakness of American wel-
fare in quantitative terms is surprising - I will demon-
strate this in the following paragraphs. One explanation
for this weakness is that the 1950's represented a virtual
welfare depression for the United States, with welfare
services and social insurance taken as a proportion of the
GNP growing at an annual rate of 1.9% (Table 1). In the
1960's welfare assumed a large and ever-increasing propor-
tion of the national energy and taxes. The average rate
of growth in proportion to the GNP for the 1961-1971 period
was 4.4 and in the last years of the decade the annual
increases were twice as high as the figure (Table 1).
The most favored institutional recipient, on a consis-
tent basis, has been education, and America is virtually
alone in the world in the scope of its expansion in higher
education. In the 1940's, education, veterans' payments
and social security were expanded, and many of the veterans'
benefits went directly to educational institutions; by 1950
more money was spent yearly on education than on social
security, and more than on health and welfare, other welfare
services, and public housing combined. By the end of the
1950's, education and social security were still expanding,
and all other public welfare services were declining. Less
money was spent on public aid in 1957 than in 1937, less
money was spent in 1957 on veterans' payments than had been
spent in 1947, and health, allied welfare services and
housing combined received barely one-third of educational
funding. In an amazing fashion, educational growth kept
this same pace in the 1960's. This was the decade for the
creative use of welfare. Public aid was expanded as a means
of dealing with civil disturbance, and the operational and
policy reforms from 1964-1971 brought the first large public
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Table 2: Soviet Welfare Expenditures - Osborn
(1968: Table 2-3, page 39)
Expenditures from all sources for items in the 'social wage'
compared to national income (in billions of post-1960
rubles)
Social Wage
Expenditures Income (x)
Year A B A/B
1958 23.8 127.7 18.6
1960 27.3 145.0 18.8
1965 41.5 192.6 21.5
1968 55.0 237.0 23.2
1970(xx) 8.5% increase roughly the same,
23-24%
NOTE: (x) For national income, Osborn uses the Net
Material Product, which excludes salaries for
services that are included in the U.S. Gross
National Product.
(xx) Using the same sources as Osborn, Pravda's
reports on plan achievement, there are the
comparisons of January - June 1970 to the
first six months of 1969.
A/B: Social wage, that is, welfare spending, taken as a
proportion of the net material product; this is
comparable to social welfare in the United States
taken as a proportion of Gross National Product.
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aid increases since 1939. Urban renewal funds increased at
a ten-fold rate following strong grass-roots demands from
unions, the construction industry, local politicians, and
real estate developers; the funds were not used for low
cost housing, of course, but for profitable middle-income
housing, shopping malls and administrative buildings
(Anderson, 1967; O'Connor, 1974). Nevertheless, schools
became a major recipient of poverty program funds, and the
increases nearly matched, dollar for dollar, the enormous
cost of the entire medicare program contained under social
security (whole paragraph - see Table 1).
-- Table 2 about here --
At this point, a quantitative comparison with the
Soviet Union has some merit, because it does illustrate
what was called earlier the "weakness" of American welfare.
Although we lack the detailed figures that are available
in the United States, it is obvious that Soviet welfare
expenses for the last fifteen years assume a higher pro-
portion of their national income than the 1971 American
figure of 16.9' (see Table 2); this proportionally heavy
welfare spending spending went back into the 1950's and has
gone forward into the 1970's. Using this inexact compara-
tive standard, welfare expenditures as a proportion of the
nationally defined national income, the Soviet-American
comparisons are these: 1958 U.S.S.R. 18.8%, U.S. 10.6%;
1965 U.S.S.R. 21.5', U.S. 11.8%; 1968 U.S.S.R. 23.2%, U.S.
13.8%/; 1970 U.S.S.R. 23-24%, U.S. 15.2% (see Tables 1 and
2). This comparative standard is flawed. (1) The American
GNP includes welfare and service costs, but the Soviet net
material product excludes these salaries. If the social
wage were added to the net material product for the U.S.S.R,
the proportion of the social wage to the higher figure would
be smaller, hence closer to the American figure. (2) There
is another distortion involved in economic comparison.
Since it is generally agreed that welfare expenses rise as
the national income rises, it is worthwhile to note that
the national income of the Soviet Union, although the second
largest in the world, is half that of the U.S. (see Table
3a). Welfare dollars are the last allocation of industri-
alization, and if this pattern has any meaning for the
U.S.S.R., welfare spending should increase as the country
approaches the American level of affluence. At worst, if
the net material product is increased by the social wage,
-764-
Table 3: Taylor-Hudson (1972) International Rankings
(a) Gross national product in millions of dollars
Recent Long-term
Rank Country Growth Rate Years Growth Rate Years GNP
1 U.S. 4.6%/year 1960-65 3.7%/year 1950-65 695500
2 U.S.S.R. 6.4%/year 1960-65 6.2%/year 1953-65 313000
(NMP)
(b) Enrollment in higher education (Table 4.4 page 229)
1 U.S. 28400 students/one million inhabitants
2 N.Z. 21000 students/one million inhabitants
3 U.S.S.R. 16740 students/one million inhabitants
(c) Physicians per one million population (Table 4.12,
page 259)
Rank Country Physicians per one million population Date
1 Israel 2393 1964
2 U.S.S.R. 2053 1964
3 Hungary 1795 1964
4 Austria 1772 1964
5 Czechoslovakia 1754 1963
6 Italy 1635 1964
7 Bulgaria 1628 1964
8 New Zealand 1493 1964
9 Argentina 1466 1960
10 Switzerland 1460 1964
11 West Germany 1445 1963
12 United States 1439 1963
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the U.S.S.R.'s proportional spending is 36% greater than
America's spending rather than 68%. At best, the poten-
tial for Soviet welfare spending is enormous when compar-
ed to the U.S., both 'systems' held equal.
-- Table 3 about here --
Quantity can be expressed another way. By comparative
standards,the Soviet Union is strong where America is
strong and, additionally, it is strong where America is
weak. In the field of education, America leads the world
in the proportion of students enrolled in higher education
per one million population, and the Soviet Union is 40%
lower, in third place (see Table 3b). In the field of
health, where the United States does not fare as well, the
U.S. is twelfth in the world in the proportion of physicians
per one million population, 30% lower than the second-
ranked U.S.S.R. 7  In terms of on-going programs, the United
States is no match for the'Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has
extensive day care, completely socialized medicine, full
paid extensive maternity leaves, mass low-cost housing, low
cost vacation areas, full tuition-plus-stipend scholarships
for those pursuing higher education, state-funded education-
al leaves for young workers in industry, and so forth.
If quantitative comparison was the issue, the essay
would finish here. The Soviet Union has more welfare than
the United States by any conceivable standard of measure-
ment. The American proportion of welfare spending relative
to the GNP is rising, however, and may someday equal the
U.S.S.R. Again, Soviet welfare expenses come from taxes,
they are not 'free'; if Americans prefer to spend their
welfare dollars privately, there is no ethical reason to
support public welfare over private welfare -- once the
treatment of the poor has been provided for. Quantitative
comparisons provide no guidance for policy choice or
scholarly understanding. The question is: is there a
qualitative differences between Soviet and American welfare?
I. SUBTLE AND CRUDE WELFARE
This essay will explore only one qualitative standard,
the fact that American welfare is dominated by crude tech-
niques and Soviet welfare is dominated by subtle techniques.
As Gilbert Steiner has said, these form two
-766-
principal styles of public subsidy to the poor. "The crude
technique limits benefits to those who establish need
through disclosure of their income and resources to an
administrative official, and also explicitly pinpoints the
benficiaries. The subtle technique spreads benefits across
a broad spectrum of the population, subsidizing many with-
out need as well as those in need" (Steiner, 1971:2).
The most controversial issue in the United States since
the end of the depression, the program that offers public
aid to dependent children of essentially female-headed
families (AFDC), illustrates the value of the distinction
between subtle and crude welfare. In the United States, as
those familiar with child welfare know, there are a wide
variety of services in existence - they include homemaker
service, day care, foster care, institutional care, therapy,
financial assistance, job training, etc. (see, e.g., Kadu-
shin, 1974) - but few of these services are available to
mothers that need them and many are not available/not used
by the mothers on public assistance that qualify for them.
For example, over 3,000 agencies in the U.S. provide home-
maker service, yet it was estimated that they reached only
3700 children in a given day in 1967, 50,000 children a
year, or 1% total. Homemaker services in England and Sweden,
countries with much smaller populations, serve more children
than this: so there must be a greater need for this service
(Kadushin, 1974:300). Job training is another example.
Part of the welfare reforms under Nixon involved the estab-
lishment of job training programs enforced on mothers.
Although the WIN (Nixon's Work Incentive program) program
was coercive, although it was designed to promote workfare
rather than welfare, it still failed to provide jobs for
recipients. Only 129,000 out of an eligible pool of 1,478,
000 were enrolled, and only 22,000, 2% of the original
total, found any jobs (Steiner, 171:73). The programs
eventually become so narrow and provide so few services
that they rarely achieve any important goals. In the
U.S.S.R. , on the other hand, a broad variety of nearly free
services are available and used by women with children. In
1965 Soviet pre-school institutions took care of 6.2 million
children (Osborn, 1970:57), while licensed day care facili-
ties in the U.S. in 1969 handled 518,000 (Steiner, 1971:52).
In the U.S. children often stay with sitters, but a large
proportion, perhaps more than 100,000 are simply locked day
after day in apartments, or cared for by other children
-767-
(Pines, 1971:223). The Soviet mother has easy access to
medical facilities, transportation, cheap housing and job
training. Although the Soviet mother in most cases is not
paid to stay home and take care of her child, women who
work and women who do not are freed from enormous emotional
problems.
Another example can be found in public housing. The
unpopularity of public housing can be supported by testi-
monies from Moscow to San Francisco. The housing crisis
has been so serious in the Soviet Union that one Western
expert summarized the poor conditions as "...a source of a
great deal of human misery" (Morton, 1974:167), while Russ-
ian experts agree that it is a primary cause of extremely
low population increases (Morton, 1974, 187). Similar
complaints about sub-standard conditions and lack of public
facilities exist in the United States; when surveyed, a
large portion of poor people in San Francisco, Philadelphia,
Boston, and San Juan, Puerto Rico avidly disliked public
projects, and tenant complaints are voluminous (Steiner,
1971:127-128). In the Soviet Union all classes occupy these
houses, and there is every indication that, building for
building, these are also class-integrated (Osborn, 1970:
259). American public housing, on the other hand, is a
ghetto of aged people, welfare mothers, and low-income
families (Steiner, 1971, 122-124), far away from shopping,
good schools, and adequate transportation facilities. Re-
sidents in American public housing are terrorized by every
sort of criminal, since the residents are known to be vir-
tually defenseless. Juvenile gangs control stairways and
parking lots; old people are forced to carry enough cash to
pay off muggers, gho will severely beat anyone they stop
who has no money. The Soviet Union has its full share of
crime, but the American case is distinctive due to the soc-
ial effects of crude welfare.
Even the American programs designed in a subtle fashion
have interesting limitations. Social security programs
serve almost everyone, but they serve clients at a financial
level lower than subsistence, and this is the reason why so
many older people are on welfare. Soviet pensions are gear-
ed to half-salary and, since 1956, the pension has had a
'floor' so that the old may keep pace with inflation (Osborn,
1970:68-76). The system of higher education is an excellent
example of subtle welfare since state and federal govern-
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ments subsidize all students through the financial support
of these institutions. By steadily increasing fees and by
not offering stipends to all students, the educational
system limits the potential for advantages that subtle
techniques of welfare can offer citizens.
To sum up, then, these are the immediate disadvantages
of crude welfare. First, it isolates the poor and allows
them to be victimized by that isolation. Second, it deprives
those immediately above the needy level, certainly a large
population, by making them ineligible for services for which
they have a genuine need and for whom the deprivation of
these services causes serious harm. Third, in practice (as
in services for needy children), it encourages agencies to
continually limit the programs and narrow the recipients.
With this framework, the discussion of crude and subtle wel-
fare can continue.
II. CRUDE WELFARE: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND PHILOSOPHICAL
UNDERPINNINGS
Social Consequences
(a) Eligibility and role theory - the non-recipient
poor
Why is it that there are so many poor people eligible
for public assistance who do not choose to take it? Why is
it that, given the fact that the programs are in existence,
legislatures enact a law to prevent new recipients from
joining the program?9 It is easy to say that there is a
social stigma to welfare, and that there is no stigma to
receiving a social security check. Similarly, legislatures
do not enact a freeze on taking advantage of capital-gains
provisions for stockholding taxpayers. To appreciate the
term 'stigma' and its place in role theory, its roots must
be found in Goffman's comments on asylum inmates (1961) or
in Laing's observations on schizophrenia (1967). Labeling,
the presence of social stigma, affects both parties in a
relationship. The 'dominant' or 'normal' party sees the
other in a different, perhaps sub-human fashion, and the
stigmatized party sees the other as a dangerous adversary.
This process is so well established that, by now, it should
be familiar to anyone with a layman's understanding of the
literature. It should be no surprise, then, that the wel-
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fare relationship in a crude-stig setting works against
rational need and policy purpose. * v A crude program has its
usual, needy clientele and, in addition, it attracts chislers
and liars and repels some honest needy people. Those who
enjoy seeing the eligibility case worker as an adversary
will enjoy beating the system, and those who respect their
own privacy or fear a powerful antagonist (in all likelihood,
the aged) will refuse to participate. The only people harmed
are those in need, the silent poor.
(b) Eligibility and disfunction - the Negro family
One celebrated social consequence of America's peculiar
system of welfare eligibility has been its contribution to
the breakup of the Negro family. Daniel Moynihan, writing
for the Department of Labor, revealed the tangled relation-
ship between public policy and the family by developing a
thoroughly falacious conclusion based on the statistical
relationship between AFDC, unemployment, and the increase
in the number of Negro female-headed households. Essentially,
Moynihan argued that there must be a Negro family pathology
because welfare cases from 1962-64 rose while unemployment
fell, reversing the stable positive unemployment-welfare
correlation that existed from 1948-1962 (Department of Labor,
1965:13). Given the enormous pool of welfare-eligible fam-
ilies outside AFDC, there was no reason to expect that this
correlation would continue, especially in a decade in which
the poor's sense of its own rights changed dramatically. It
was also clear, as Moynihan argued, that by refusing public
assistance to stable low-income families, the welfare system
directly caused family break-up. Rule-making policies such
as these strict eligibility regulations applied by AFDC
officials inevitably produce comparable social disfunctions.
Welfare recipients, for instance, could not work since all
rewards from employment were entirely deducted from public
assistance. Although the 1969 reforms were intended to
eliminate this problem, the maximum income provisions set
for eligibility were so low (Steiner, 1971:12) that family
break-up, fraud, grievances over part-time work, night raids,
elimination of welfare chislers, etc., are still commonplace
problems for the AFDC system.
(c) Eligibility and its discontents
"Eligibility" has played a central role in contemporary
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American welfare. An entire social movement has grown up
around issues surrounding welfare regulations, namely the
National Welfare Rights Association. This is an organiza-
tion manned largely by social work professionals and wel-
fare recipients; it is amazing that public welfare has been
so clearly etched on the consciousness of those involved in
it that they form, as a living counterpart of the Three
Penny Opera, a modern social community like criminals,
students, or those of special ethnic-racial origins. On
one side the NWRO has demanded a minimal set of subtle
reforms such as day care, a low guaranteed income, respect
for legal rights of recipients, and so forth. On the other
hand, the NWRO demands changes on eligibility rules. The
organziation complained about the man-in-the-house rules,
the violation of privacy, prohibition on earning additional
income, residency rules, higher furniture and clothing
allowances (Trattner, 1974:262), obviously their popular
organizing demands. If social protest informs us about the
character of a society, then it is no error to focus on
eligibility as a substantive comparative criterion.
Philosophical Underpinnings
This essay was not written to contribute to the vast
literature arguing that contemporary liberals have betrayed
the poor. It is evident, however, that the philosophical
justification for crude welfare rests on the way we perceive
those who need welfare. Consequently, by carefully defining
who is poor and by concentrating on the personal character-
istics of the poor, we finally deal with a limited section
of the population rather than a broad category of human
needs.
(a) Rose Friedman and Milton Friedman - How many poor
are there?
Social evolutionists to the contrary, most societies
have recognized the ethical necessity of helping their less
fortunate citizens, if only because the more fortunate fear
that they may be reduced to poverty. America's conservatives
are no different; the most famous of them, Milton Friedman,
concedes that poverty has a negative neighborhood effect on
the community, although he criticized state programs design-
ed to alleviate poverty (1962:177-189). Instead of discuss-
ing welfare needs, the emphasis is on poverty lines: shall
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it be $3000 dollars (Ibid., 193). If it is $3000 (1960
dollars), then in 35 years, if present trends continue,
there will be no poor at all (Rose Friedman, 1968:38).
Poverty lines based on income pay no attention to needs, so
why would anyone pay attention to statistically defined
homogeneous income groups? Basically, for Milton Friedman,
two moral principles are at odds, the free enterprise system
and the needs of the poor, and unless the poor and the needs
of the poor are yrefully limited, welfare measures may in-
finately expand.. This, in one sentence, is the philoso-
phical justification for crude welfare. Milton Friedman and
Rose Friedman have reminded us that social welfare is not a
band-aid for the poor, not simply a humanitarian ideal, but
a threat to free-market capitalism.
(b) Galbraith - Small pockets of poverty
Liberal proponents of the welfare state have no such
fears of welfare measures, yet in one respect their argument
scarcely differs from that of Milton Friedman and Rose Fried-
man. Galbraith wrote that in an affluent society, poverty
is specific to unusual communities such as marginal farmers,
or individual cases such as female-headed households, the
handicapped, etc. (1958:252-254); a decade later, he wrote
that discrimination against Negroes is not a product of the
industrial system, but of a prior disadvantage in schools
and environment (Galbraith, 1967:250-251). Although state
services are nothing to be feared per se, Galbraith's point
is that American society is essentially so well off that
the shortage of state welfare measures is not a pressing
issue to most people. It is a justification of crude welfare
in that it argues that the critical problems are those of
various small groups and that, for the rest of the society,
reforms will come when and if they are politically feasible,
thus accepting the limitations imposed by crude welfare.
All of the discussion associated with limited welfare -
the stigma, the fight over eligibility regulations, the
statistical income lines, the family pathology - exist be-
cause social scientists believe that there is some particular
group that desparately needs services that everyone else in
American society enjoys. In welfare terms, the second lowest
income fifth is not much better off than the lowest earning
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group. For some unrealized welfare needs, an enormous
proportion of the people may be in dire straits. When
Steiner discusses the issue of public housing (1971:122-
191), these are not simply the problems of black people,
old people, or female-headed households. A large percentage
of the American urban population is faced with high rents
and deteriorating conditions, and the policy of separating
out the very poorest and packing them into high-rise apart-
ments does not speak in any way about high rents and the
worsening quality of urban life. As for medical attention
(see footnote 7) or day care - there is no special poverty
group when it comes to these services, there are no $3000
lines that can be drawn and there is no way to meet these
needs without major policy changes. Poverty is a valuable
subject in the debate of academic ideas, but when it is
translated into welfare policylit becomes, in the elementary
sense of the word, propaganda. The distinction between
crude and subtle welfare is essentially whether or not the
needs of a specific number of poor people are separated from
the needs of the much larger group of lower and lower-middle
income families, with proponents of a crude welfare system
claiming that they can be separated, and proponents of a
subtle system claiming the reverse.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS
Subtle techniques of welfare have their drawbacks, and
the most obvious one is the cost of these programs. America's
only two examples of subtle welfare, social security and
education, consumed the lion's share of welfare costs even
before health services were included in the social security
administration. In order to cut costs, the Soviets have
been led to employ steps that would concern some Americans.
What has happened to Soviet doctors is exactly what has
happened to American public school teachers and social work-
ers, and what American doctors, therapists and counselors,
and college professors fear may occur. The Soviet doctor
is paid the salary of a skilled worker, has few special
privileges associated with professionalism, and has had her
time allocation and movements limited by organizational,
hospital, demands. After professional expenses are deducted,
the median income of American general practioners was $37,400
in 1970 (Statistical Abstract, 1973:68). That sum of money
is the salary of three American skilled workers, and would
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pay three Soviet doctors. High paid, high status independ-
ent professionals in the United States, doctors, dentists,
academic scientists-consultants, psychiatrists and highly
paid professional therapists would have a lot to lose if
their income and work duties were administratively defined.
Those who believe that only independent professionals can
set standards of quality will see this as a severe defect
in subtle welfare policy. Those who feel that such profes-
sionals are motivated by selfish interests with no concern
for the public will be less concerned about their losses.
The cost-cutting that is inevitably part of subtle
welfare has other consequences. Rather than quality stand-
ards of welfare permeating down to the poor, inferior
services may prove the general rule. This is precisely
what has happened in Soviet housing. As disasters, wars,
and massive rural-to-urban migration created housing short-
ages, nearly every family hd only one or two rooms to live
in, most public housing lacked design, imagination or com-
fort; and getting a place to live has been a persistent
difficulty. In education, in day care, in medicine every-
one has some quality standards that are jeopardized by mass
welfare, and the better off you are, the more you expect
special standards.
Subtle techniques of welfare are a qualitative alter-
native to the failings of American welfare. In part, the
American system has evolved because of the philosophical
assumptions of social scientists and the inherited value of
personal independence on the part of the American voters,
e.g., we would rather pay educational costs than public
assistance. It is no disgrace for a young man or woman to
go to college and use up $2500-$3000/year in public funds,
but there is a stigma attached to young mothers with depen-
dent children or elderly people receiving this exact amount
of money in public funds.
In part, American welfare has been shaped by a force
far more powerful than philosophical assumptions and inherit-
ed values. The debate over medical insurance and control
over medical facilities illustrates who defines services in
this area of welfare. Special interests keep hospitals,
blood banks, and insurance free of direct government controls,
(e.g., Titmuss, 1971:158-172). Real estate developers, on
the other hand, learned that the government can be a welcome
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friend when funds must be guaranteed and social costs paid
for the purposes of private profit (see Anderson, 1964,
especially 107-123); there was a five-fold expansion of
urban renewal funds from 1960-1971. The fundamental Ameri-
can ethic has defined the welfare system, the ability of
those who influence policy to realize personal financial
profit.
FOOTNOTES
IModels, especially those such a 'totalitarianism', commonly
describe differences in kind rather than simply qualitative
institutional features. When Friedrich and Brzezinski
(1961: 9, 10) cited six general features prevailing in
these regimes - official ideology, a single mass party,
terroristic police control, etc. - it was understood that
variations in control existed from year to year, but that
the character of the party, the economy, and the communi-
cations system was such that simply a decrease in control
would not alter fundamental differences with American
institutions.
2 The most obvious example of this sort of academic propaganda
appears in Brzinski and Huntington's Political Power, USA/
USSR (1963, 1964). In the chapter on political alienation,
certainly the most serious political problem in the U.S.
for the last decade, the American phenomena is explained
as the personal failings of those who dissented. Meanwhile
commonplace events in the USSR and the U.S., white collar
crime and embezzlement, are seen as a major failing of the
Soviet system.
3Those who studied Soviet emigrees after World War Two found
that an enormous proportion supported extensive welfare
benefits (Inkeles and Bauer, 1968:242), and many cited
their unhappiness with American medical services. We would
assume that this group would be likely to criticize prac-
tices in the Soviet Union and to support those in the United
States. Mark Field, who had written a book on the totali-
tarian aspects of medicine in the mid-1950's (1957) changed
his perspective considerably by the late 1960's (1967), ap-
parently feeling that a great deal had been accomplished by
the Soviet medical system in terms of greatly improving the
health standards of the country.
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4Reinhard Bendix (1964) developed T.H. Marshall's concept
of 'citizenship', presenting the view that welfare defici-
encies of the poor have been and will ultimately be resolved
in Western society. Bendix is far from idealistic - very
naive versions of this view can be found - but Bendix's
view unites politics and welfare.
5The works of Titmuss (1971) on medicine, Cloward and Piven
(1971) on public assistance for family support, and Martin
Anderson (1967) on urban renewal contain specific, well-
documented arguments about the failure of welfare practices
to meet the needs of those it was designed to serve. Also,
see footnotes 7, 8, 9 of this manuscript.
6 If the Soviet national income, actually the net material
product, is added to the social wage expenditures the 1968
result is as follows: 55+237=292 billion rubles, 55 292=
18.8% (see Table 2). The operation is legitimate since
most of the social wage expenditures are excluded from the
Soviet calculation of net material product. If the original
figure from 1968, 23.2,0, is compared to the U.S. proportion
of 13.85, the U.S.S.R.'s percentage is 68% higher. If the
modified figure is used, the U.S.S.R.'s percentage is 36%
higher.
7There are two issues at stake here. First, what are the
details behind these proportions and, second, does a low
physician/1,000,000 population actually indicate that many
people lack medical attention.
(1) The Soviet Union educates more doctors, but the time
they spend in post-high school training is less than Ameri-
can students, even when it is understood that the last two
years of Soviet secondary school may be more comparable to
two American college years rather than two high school years.
Thus, the Western response to the figures is that "...the
final product of Soviet medical education is a 'technical
expert' rather than a 'professional with wisdom'"; this is
a British view. Dr. John Crenshaw, An American, wrote that
physicians "...are not members of a professional class, but
rather technicians on a basis comparable with engineers,
scientific workers, and skilled mechanics" (see Alt, 1959:
135). The Western reader should have some perspective on
this: Soviet general practitioners have less liberal arts
training (that is, a few less courses that would correspond
to upper division courses), and a few less medical school
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courses, and less formal intership practice, given the way
that the Soviet educational system is designed. On the
other hand, the Soviet doctor practices in a clinic rather
than a private office, which carries the potential, perhaps
the actuality, of prolonged intership. If the American
reader believes that these facts make the Soviet doctor a
'technician' and the American doctor a 'wise professional',
fine, since these are the only substantive differences.
Perhaps American doctors are impressed by something else
- most Soviet doctors are women, earn a skilled workers'
salary, and work short hours at a clinic.
(2) The second problem is more serious. Two approaches to
the subject, one by medical sociologists studying poverty
and one by medical geographers studying physician distri-
bution, have both concluded that a considerable proportion
of the population is not served. Julius Roth, for instance,
presents that following study of 4320 families of children
in the pediatric age group, but he does not say how and
where the sample was gathered. The proportion of families
with a regular doctor or pediatrician is quite small, and
presumably the rest rely on emergency room care.
Roth (1969:218) % Having a Physician who
Family Income No/Families Usually Looks After Children
Welfare 621 16
Less than $3000 333 24
$3000-4500 1366 38
$4500-6000 1009 55
$6000-7500 452 62
$7500-10,000 191 63
more than $10,000 75 85
Medical geographers have estimated that ". ..for good quality
primary medical care, approximately 133 physicians should
exist for each 100,000 persons. In 1970, the U.S. averaged
52.8 physicians/l00,000 with some areas well below average.
The East South Central area, for instance, had 39.6 physi-
cians/100,000, the West South Central had 43.0 and the
South Atlantic had 46.5 (Shannon-Dever, 1974:37-38). This
is a study of primary physicians, general practitioners
and pediatricians, whose numbers have been sharply declin-
ing relative to the population throughout this century. In
critical portions of the population, the rates are quite
small; the rate of black physicians/l00,000 blacks (page
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50), of rural physicians (page 47) and female physicians/
100,000 women (page 47) show minute ratios. In 1953, the
Executive Secretary of the State Medical Association of
Mississippi said that there was an over-abundance of physi-
cians (1953 ratio: 70/100,000) to serve the population
because "...the Negro constitutes nearly half the total
population", and in 1966 (ratio: 37/100,000) the man who
occupied the same office said, "It (a physician shortage)
never was true and patently could not be true today" (page
41). There is a lower physician/rural population ratio in
the U.S.S.R.than exists in urban areas, but it is quite
clear from the American data that important sections of the
population are not served at all.
8The housing of the poor has always represented one of the
sore points in the discussion of poverty. Public housing
has been the constant subject of casitgation, from Rainwat-
er's study of the Pruitt-Igoe houses in St. Louis to Jane
Jacobs' general attacks city planning. Except for Jacobs,
most observers feel that the problem of dangerous living
conditions and second rate facilities is merely one aspect
of the problem presented by the poorer and older urban areas
in the United States (e.g., Steiner, 1971:122-153). Silber-
man, for instance, outlines the urban renewal process:
racism and high rents ghettoize the poor; urban renewal
projects that have nothing to do with housing for the poor
destroy available apartments; overcrowding and rents
increase because the poor have no other alternatives for
housing; low-income high rises do not even approach public
need and suitable standards of living (Silberman, 1964:308-
358).
9 By 1970, 14 million people received some form of cash, food,
or housing assistance, and 11 million people below the
poverty line of $3700 for a four person family did not take
part in these programs. Some of these eleven million were
temporarily poor, such as low-income graduate students, some
could not meet eligibility requirements or did not have
programs available for them, and some were too proud.
Cloward and Piven felt that the entire welfare system
operated on the assumption that few poor will ask for the
full range of assistance that is available (1971), and thus
it continues to meet the needs of the poor in a sub-standard
fashion.
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10 Goffman makes this point in his well-known attack on the
'medical model' (1961:321-386). The asylum has the form
of medical treatment - diagnosis, perscription, and recov-
ery - but the actual treatment produces patent resistance
and the deterioration of mental condition, a far cry from
the medical prediction. The same situation is common to
welfare. A welfare "model" would look like this: the
determination of eligibility takes place, and then a case
worker provides counseling or refers the client to proper
service agencies, and, finally, the client leaves public
assistance. At times,the welfare system works this way for
recipients, but most of the time it does not.
llMilton Friedman's alternative is the elimination of welfare,
that is, the elimination of social security, public assist-
ance, and so forth. To help those who would suffer from
this, he proposes that every American family receive at
least $3000, either by his own efforts or from public funds,
and this is the substance of the negative income tax (1962:
177-195). Friedman's idea is that the normal process of
welfare is paternalistic, and that a guaranteed income or
a negative income tax will increase freedom by allowing
those below a given income to get cash rather than 'needed
services'. Once the individual or family has more than
$3000, his 'needs' are irrelevant, which leaves a great
deal of human misery without social provision.
12Hyman Lumer (1970) and many others have attacked the study
of the poor rather than the study of poverty as in instance
where social analysts 'blame poverty on its victims'. Lumer
argues that when we concentrate on the personal character-
istics of the poor, we invariably comment on their lack of
ambition or education (p.208, 209) rather than blame the low
paying jobs or the structural unemployment. Lumer's com-
plaint is not so much with Galbraith as with the intellec-
tual and policy-oriented style of analysis that accepted
the capitalist status quo while treating the poor as
failures.
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